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Abstract
Privacy preservation in distributed computations is an important subject as
digitization and new technologies enable collection and storage of vast amounts
of data, including private data belonging to individuals. To this end, there
is a need for a privacy preserving computation framework that minimises the
leak of private information during computations while being efficient enough
for practical usage. This paper presents a step towards such a framework with
the proposal of a real number secret sharing scheme that works directly on
real numbers without the need for conversion to integers which is the case in
related schemes. The scheme offers computations like addition, multiplication,
and division to be performed directly on secret shared data (the cipher text
version of the data). Simulations show that the scheme is much more efficient
in terms of accuracy than its counterpart version based on integers and finite
field arithmetic. The drawback with the proposed scheme is that it is not
perfectly secure. However, we provide a privacy analysis of the scheme, where
we show that the leaked information can be upper bounded and asymptotically
goes to zero. To demonstrate the scheme, we use it to perform Kalman filtering
directly on secret shared data.
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In recent years, there has been a rapid development of technologies for dig-
itization and collection and storage of data. Consequently, various distributed
algorithms for the efficient processing of the collected data are being developed
in many research communities like signal processing, control, machine learning,
and optimization. Simultaneously, concerns about privacy and the possible mis-
use of the data means a sudden big interest in embedding cryptographic methods
into the distributed algorithms to achieve privacy preserving data processing,
[1, 2, 3].
So far, efficient data processing and privacy preservation are two terms that
seems difficult to combine since the cryptographic methods tend to bring a sub-
stantial overhead in either communication, computation or both. Moreover,
security of cryptographic methods such as secret sharing and homomorphic en-
cryption relies on modular arithmetic, which entails that all data to be protected
must be integers and computations on this data must be translated into equiv-
alent computations using finite field arithmetic, [4, 5, 6]. The drawbacks of this
are, for instance, loss of precision in the solution (because of rounding decimal
numbers to integers) and that many operations such as division becomes very
intractable.
For some applications, efficient processing, that is not constrained to finite
field arithmetic, is crucial. Thus, it becomes relevant to consider a trade-off be-
tween privacy and efficiency since after all; limited privacy is better than none.
To this end, we explore distributed computations in the secure multiparty com-
putation [7] setup, where only cipher texts travel between participants and plain
texts stay hidden throughout computations. Essentially, what we propose is a
real number secret sharing scheme that circumvents the disadvantages of us-
ing only integers and modular arithmetic and consequently achieves improved
performance compared to state-of-the-art methods. The scheme works directly
on real numbers and we show straight forward implementations of addition,
multiplication and division performed directly on the secret shared data. The
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shortcoming to our proposed scheme is that it does not guarantee perfect se-
curity like its counterpart version based on integers and modular arithmetic.
However, we carefully control the amount of leaked information and provide
information theoretic results to support our claims.
As a motivating example, we demonstrate the use of the proposed scheme to
perform privacy preserving Kalman filtering. That is, we consider a linear dy-
namical system with state-transition matrix A, control input matrix B, control
input uk, process noise wk and state vector xk:
xk = Axk−1 + Buk + wk. (1)
Observations (or measurements) of the state vector, zk are modeled as
zk = Hxk + vk, (2)
where H is the observation matrix and vk is the measurement noise. The objec-
tive is to estimate the true state of the system from the noisy observations, which
is optimally done using the Kalman filter. The privacy concern emerges from
the measurements which could be private data that potentially leaks private
information. Scenarios where a problem of this form appears, could for instance
be traffic monitoring [8], medical monitoring [9], and consumption forecasting
[10]. The problem of privacy preserving Kalman filtering has already been stud-
ied for instance in [11] that uses a form of data compression to preserve privacy
of measurements, [12] that base the privacy on a combination of homomorphic
encryption and secure multiparty computation techniques, and [13] that relies
on differential privacy. These existing works all suffer from a degradation in
output utility compared to the none-privacy preserving solution due to noise
insertion or to the previously mentioned rounding of reals to integers. We will
show that a privacy aware Kalman filter based on our real number secret sharing
scheme achieves significantly improved output utility. Furthermore, we compare
our privacy preserving Kalman filter to the one proposed in [12] and show that
ours has a reduction in computation and communication overhead.
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1.1. State of the art
The typical way of preserving privacy of real numbers is to simply discard
the decimals and keep the integer part which is the suitable representation for
most cryptographic methods, [14, 15, 16] . The induced error bounds caused
by the truncation, can be made small by introducing scaling constants prior to
truncation. However, the size of the modular field, in which the cryptographic
calculations take place, increases according to the size of the scaling factors and
thus cannot be made arbitrarily big.
One of the first more direct ways to deal with non-integers in cryptographic
computations, was made in 2010 by Catrina et al. in [17]. Their proposed solu-
tion builds on a fixed-point representation of real numbers that allows the use of
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme as the underlying cryptographic technique. In
[18] this solution was applied to privacy preserving linear programming. Along
this line of research, [19] proposed in 2013 a similar secure floating-point com-
putation scheme also based on a linear secret sharing framework. In 2016, [20]
proposed other techniques for representing secure real numbers suitable for a
secret sharing framework with their so-called golden-section and logarithmic
number formats.
Apart from secret sharing based secure computation frameworks, there has
also been several attempts to secure real number computations in homomorphic
encryption based frameworks, [21, 22, 23]. Analog to the approach based on
secret sharing, the main idea here is to convert the real number into a multi-bit
binary integer to achieve a fixed precision presentation of a real number. The
drawback with these approaches is the time consuming computational overhead
with homomorphic encryption and also that the proposed schemes only offer
addition and in some cases multiplication of cipher-texts. This is in contrast
to our scheme that allows addition, multiplication and division to be performed
efficiently on the cipher-text data.
Finally, our work is closely related to [24] that considers secret sharing
schemes (SSS) over infinite domains, e.g. the real number line. Among oth-
ers, they propose a scheme very similar to ours which is based on polynomials
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Table 1: Comparison of interactive operations (IO) of state-of-the-art protocols, where lt is the
bit-length of the truncated secret and l and k is, respectively, the bit-length of the significant
and exponent of the fixed point represented secret.
IO addition IO multiplication IO division Precision
Shamir’s SSS with truncation [14] 0 2 220lt + log 2lt + 238lt + 3 Up to scaling
Shamir’s SSS with fixed point
representation [19]
14l + 9k + (log l) log log l
+(l + 9) log l + 4 log k + 37
8l + 10 2 log l(l + 2) + 3l + 8 Up to scaling
Real numbers SSS 0 2 3 Machine precision
and Lagrange interpolation. However, they consider a game between a dealer
and an adversary, which is for the dealer to chose a scheme and a secret such that
the adversary has the least probability of guessing the secret. On the contrary,
our work assumes that a group of parties would like to perform computations
without exposing data belonging to the individual parties. In this sense, the se-
cret is the data, and not something we can chose to our liking. Also, we provide
a quantification of the privacy loss of the scheme and propose how to use the
scheme for secure multiparty computation (SMPC), which [24] does not.
1.2. Contribution
The paper puts forth a real number secret sharing scheme which bypasses the
usual restrictions to integer secrets and finite field computations. This makes
the scheme very practical as solutions can be calculated with high precision and
without the need for computations being performed with modular arithmetic.
The scheme performs the same or with significant less computation and com-
munication complexity compared to state-of-the-art methods. In Table 1 the
number of interactive operations (IO) are given for a selected number of state-
of-the-art protocols. IO’s are those that require communication between the
participants, and since the time spent on local computations vanishes compared
to time spent on IO’s, this measure gives both an indication of communication
and computation complexity.
The main contribution of the paper can be summarized as:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt for a SMPC scheme
that works directly on the real number line and consequently offers a
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trade-off between privacy and practicality.
• The proposed scheme bypasses the requirements for modular arithmetic
and integer secrets which is in contrast to state-of-the-art SMPC tech-
niques.
• The scheme allows addition, multiplication and division to be performed
directly on shares (ciphertext version of the data), opposed to related
schemes that typically only allow addition and in some cases multiplica-
tion.
• The paper provides an in-depth analysis of the privacy guaranties of the
scheme as well as a quantification of leaked data.
1.3. Outline
The paper proceeds in section 2 by introducing the preliminaries and giving
motivation for the work. Section 3 states formally the problem of the paper,
while section 4 presents the proposed scheme and the privacy analysis. In section
5 we give a numerical evaluation of the proposed scheme, while section 6 provides
simulations of the scheme for Kalman filtering and finally, section 7 concludes
the paper.
2. Preliminaries and Motivation
In this section, we clarify our notation and terminology and afterwards we
give a brief introduction to the concept of secret sharing and SMPC, while
subsequently discussing their shortcomings which motivates the work in this
paper.
2.1. Notation and Terminology
Let P be an index set of n > 2 participants. We assume that each par-
ticipant p ∈ P can communicate privately with each of the other participants
j ∈ P or alternatively that there exists a number of computing parties that
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(a) n participants that can communicate pri-
vately with each other.
(b) n participants and computing parties (the
grey squares).
Figure 1: Illustration of two scenarios of the communication network. The first scenario
(a), each participant can communicate privately with each of the other participant, and all
computations are performed by the participants themselves. In (b) each participant can
communicate privately with a number of computing parties (the grey squares) and each of
the computing parties can communicate privately with each of the other computing parties.
The computing parties receives shares of the input data from the participants and perform all
computations without learning the secret data.
each participant can communicate with. Each of these scenarios is illustrated
in Fig. 1. The advantage of the second scenario is that the computing parties
do most of the computations and hence the participants do not have to pos-
sess large computation capabilities. Furthermore, the participants need only to
communicate with a number of computing parties (which can be as low as 3).
In the remaining of the paper we do not make a distinction between these two
scenarios, but remark that any presented method can straightforward be used
in both.
Concerning notation, let s be a secret value belonging either to a participant
or to an external entity providing secret data. We use {s[p]}p∈P to denote the
set of so-called shares of s. In other words, each share s[p] is a cipher-text
version of s. Combining a set {s[p]}p∈T of shares, for T ⊆ P where t < |T | ≤ n
and t is an integer threshold, the shares can be deciphered and s recreated.
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2.2. Secret Sharing, SMPC and their shortcomings
Secret sharing in general lets a party ”share” a secret among n participants,
such that at least t + 1 ≤ n of the participants must cooperate to learn the
secret and opposite; no subset of less than t + 1 participants gets information
about the secret. There are many different secret sharing schemes, each tailored
to different use cases. Perhaps the most simple (and intuitive) secret sharing
scheme is the additive one [7], where t = n meaning that all shares are needed






 mod q, (3)
where q is a large prime number. When choosing n− 1 of the shares uniformly
on [0, q − 1] and the last share such that (3) holds, the modular arithmetic
ensures that all shares are uniformly distributed. This means that the scheme
is perfectly secure since the uniform distribution holds no information about
the secret. The disadvantage is that s must be an element of Fq, where Fq is a
finite field of q elements.
Many secret sharing schemes, like the additive one and Shamirs scheme
[25], are very useful in SMPC protocols. These protocols, lets n participants
compute a function, that takes as input a private value from each participant,
while keeping the private values secret. For instance, for secrets s1, s2 ∈ Fq, the
sum s1 + s2 can be calculated directly on additive shares of each of the secrets;




 mod q, (4)
where s1[p] + s2[p] is computed by the p’th participant.
The drawback is that q must be bigger than s1+s2 in order to get the correct
result and if no information about the secret data is available, it can be difficult
to choose q.
More advanced schemes like Shamir’s scheme, also allows multiplication of
secrets directly on the shares and in principle also division. However, the division
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will be finite field division [26] and not real number division. As introduced in
[14], there are complicated tricks, which usually involve bit-decomposition of
the secrets, that will enable the computation of real number division performed
on the shares. However, say that the secret to be divided is −3 (which would
be represented as q− 3 in Fq ), what effectively would happen is the division of
q − 3 and not −3, which would lead to incorrect results. This is an example of
how finite field arithmetic complicates the computations which leads to part of
our motivation to introduce a real number secret sharing scheme that does not
depend on finite field arithmetic.
3. Problem Statement
Upon the discussion in section 2.2, we conclude that the problem of pre-
serving privacy of real numbers without being limited to finite field arithmetic
is indeed a relevant topic in privacy preserving computations. To address this
problem, we will propose a real number secret sharing scheme. To this end, we
start with the following definition.
Definition 1 (Real Number Secret Sharing Scheme). A real number secret
sharing scheme consists of two algorithms; share and recon. share(s, t,P) =
{s[p]}p∈P takes a secret s ∈ R, the threshold t ∈ N with t < n and the indices
of n participants P and outputs a share s[p] ∈ R for each participant p ∈ P.
The algorithm recon({s[p]}p∈T ) = s outputs the secret s upon inputting at least
t+ 1 shares from any set of participants p ∈ T , where T ⊆ P with |T | > t.
We have the following requirements for the real number secret sharing scheme.
• Correctness. A reconstructed secret should be equal to the original
secret, that is s− recon({s[p]}p∈T = 0.
• Privacy. Only by combining at least t shares of s should it be possible to
reconstruct s. A set of fewer than t shares should reveal only very little
information about s. We state this formally by using the information
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theoretic measure called mutual information [27, p.250];
I(X;Y ) = h(X)− h(X|Y ), (5)
where h(X) is the entropy of the random variable X and h(X|Y ) is the
conditional entropy of X given the random variable Y . The mutual infor-
mation I(X;Y ) can be interpreted as the reduction in uncertainty about
X one has after learning the outcome of Y (and vice versa since mutual
information is symmetric). To this end, we use S and S[p] to denote the
random variables that has s and s[p] as outcomes, and we require that for
any δ > 0 there exists {S[p]}p∈T ′ such that
I(S; {S[p]}p∈T ′) ≤ δ, (6)
where T ′ ⊂ P with |T ′| ≤ t.
• Computations directly on shares. At least the operations addition,
multiplication, and division, should be applicable directly on shares. That
is, for any secrets s1, s2 ∈ R and properly defined protocols add, mult, and
inv, the following should hold
recon({add(s1[p], s2[p])}p∈T ) = s1 + s2 (7)





The problem of the paper is to define a real number secret sharing scheme
which satisfies the listed requirements assuming that each participant follows
the protocol.
4. Proposed Method
As mentioned already, we take great inspiration from Shamir’s SSS [25],
when proposing our real number SSS. To give some intuition, we explain the
derivation of the proposed scheme in comparison to Shamir’s scheme.
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The approach in Shamir’s scheme is to start by choosing t coefficients {cj}j∈T ,






 mod q, (10)
where s ∈ Fq as usual is the secret. The shares of s are then defined as
{s[p]}p∈P = {f(p)}p∈P . (11)
For the real number SSS we want to avoid modular arithmetic and have






where each cj is Gaussian distributed. We choose the Gaussian distribution
because this is the maximum entropy distribution for a random variable on the
real number line having a finite mean and variance, [27, p. 413].
Fig. 2 depicts the shares of a secret s = 5.0 for n = 11 participants
with t = 5 (and for comparison also t = 10). For the Gaussian distributed
coefficients, we use mean value zero and variance 100. As seen, the shares
seem quite systematic which is not advantageous from a privacy point of view.
Specifically, as seen in (12) the random numbers (the coefficients) are scaled
according to p ∈ P. Consequently, less weight are given to the random numbers
of the shares constructed with the lower p values. Therefore, the shares tend to
be in numerical order as observed in Fig. 2.
We can information theoretically verify that the information leak caused
by a share decreases as the numerical value of p ∈ P increases. Consider for
instance P = {1, 2, 3} and t = 2, then according to (12), the shares of s are
s[1] = s+ c1 + c2
s[2] = s+ 2c1 + 4c2
s[3] = s+ 3c1 + 9c2.
(13)
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(a) t = 5.









(b) t = 10.
Figure 2: n = 11 shares of the secret s = 5.0 with the threshold t = 5 for (a) and t = 10 for
(b), where s[p] = f(i), with f(x) being a polynomial with t coefficients normally distributed
with mean value zero and variance 100.
Then, assuming s, c1, and c2 are independent and Gaussian distributed with
mean value zero and variance σ2s , σ
2
c1 , and σ
2





































(14) clearly shows that the mutual information, and hence, information leakage
about the secret, decreases as p increases. This does not happen in Shamir’s
SSS because of the modular arithmetic. We therefore need to adjust the method
for it to work in a real number SSS.
To make sure each random number carry the same weight across shares,
we propose to construct the shares based on Lagrange interpolation [7] and we
briefly state this method in our notation.
Consider the points (α1, β1), . . . , (αt, βt) on the plane R2. A polynomial f(x)












To create shares of a secret, we choose t shares at random and interpolate
these shares to a degree (at most) t polynomial fs(x), by also using that fs(0) =































= sL0(x) + y1
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where we use that x0 = 0. The shares are then defined as
{s[p]}p∈P = {fs(p)}p∈P .
As seen in (17), the random numbers (yj) are normalized and thus have
the same weight across shares. Therefore, the shares are much less predictable
(especially as t increase) as observed in Fig. 3.
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s[p] (xj , yj)j∈T
(a) t = 5.








(b) t = 10.
Figure 3: n = 11 shares of the secret s = 5 with the threshold t = 5 for (a) and t = 10 for
(b), where s[p] = f(i), with f(x) being a polynomial. t points of f(x) (marked with a ) are
normally distributed with mean value zero and variance 100.
Moreover, we can information theoretically show that the information leak-
age of the shares constructed by (17) does not depend on the numerical value
of p. Consider, P = {1, 2, 3}, t = 2 and x1 = 1 and x2 = 3. Remark that xj are
chosen each time shares of a secret are constructed and their value is unknown
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Assuming s and yi are independent and Gaussian distributed with mean zero
and variance σ2s , σ
2
Y1
, and σ2Y2 , respectively, the mutual information yields















I(S, S[3]) = 0.
(19)
Thus, (19) shows that the information leakage caused by the shares are
independent of the numerical value of p, which is of course important from a
privacy perspective. More precisely, the difference between (14) and (19), is
that in the former each participant p knows that you gain most information
about the secrets the lower the value of p you have. In the latter, it is unknown
to the participants which shares have zero mutual information and which does
not, and it is different for each secret.
We state the share algorithm of the real number SSS formally in Algorithm 1
and expand on the privacy analysis of it in section 4.1.
Algorithm 1 share(s, t,P) = {s[p]}p∈P
Input: s is the secret, t is the threshold and P, with |P| = n is the index
set of the participants.
Output: {s[p]}p∈P is the set of shares of s.
1: Draw distinct {xj}j∈T from P, where T = {1, . . . , t}.
2: yj
iid∼ N (µY , σ2Y ) for j ∈ T , where µY and σ2Y are chosen privacy parameters.






4: {s[p]}p∈P = {fs(p)}p∈P .
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Remark, that Algorithm 1 has two privacy parameters µY and σ
2
Y which
can be chosen by the party constructing shares of its secret. The mean value
does not have a significant effect on the privacy and could in principle be chosen
randomly (or as zero as we do throughout the paper). In section 4.1 the impact
of σ2Y becomes clear.
The reconstruct algorithm of the proposed real number secret sharing scheme,
is almost identical to the one of Shamir’s scheme (the only difference is the
lacking of modular arithmetic). Since the algorithm consist solely of Lagrange
interpolation, we state it without further introduction.
Algorithm 2 recon({s[p]}p∈T ) = ŝ
Input: {s[p]}p∈T , with |T | > t, is a set of at least t+ 1 shares of s.
Output: ŝ, the reconstructed secret.




3: ŝ = fr(0).
To be clear, our proposed real number secret sharing scheme, consists of
the algorithms share and recon stated in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, re-
spectively. To give intuition about the proposed method, Example 1 gives an
example of using it.
Example 1 (Real number secret sharing). Let s = 5.0 be a secret and P=
{0.5,0.65,0.8,0.95,1.1,1.25,1.4,1.55,1.7,1.85,2} the index of the participants. Consider
share(s, t,P) in Algorithm 1 to create shares of s for n = 11 participants.
We perform the following steps with t = 5:
1. {xj}j∈T = {0.5, 0.65, 0.95, 1.4, 2}.
2. {yj}j∈T ={−466.506,393.646,602.653,−457.489,340.160}. See (xj , yj)j∈T in Fig.
3a marked with .






4. Define {s[p]}p∈P = {f(p)}p∈P . See {s[p]}p∈P in Fig. 3a marked with .
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For comparison, we perform the same steps for t = 10, where (xj , yj)j∈T are
seen in Fig. 3b marked with  and {s[p]}p∈P are seen in Fig. 3b marked with
.
We will now show that the scheme satisfies the requirements listed in section
3. We start by noting that the proof of Lagrange interpolation also proves the
correctness of the scheme. Therefore, we immediately analyse the privacy of the
scheme in the following section.
4.1. Privacy Analysis
We start out the analysis by considering one participant p ∈ P, who does
not know s, but learns s[p]. That is, from the view of p, s can be modeled as the
outcome of the random variable S having some distribution. The uncertainty
p has about s can be stated as the differential entropy h(S) of S. Also s[p] is
the outcome of a random variable S[p]. To see the relation between S and S[p],
consider the rewrite of s[p]








= sL0(p) + b(p),
(20)
To this end, we have that
S[p] = SL0(p) +B(p). (21)
We choose to model the Lj values as constants even though it can be argued that
they are indeed random variables because each xk from step 1. of Algorithm 1
are randomly chosen. However, since t is generally close to n and P is public,
there is not an insignificant probability of guessing the xk values. Consider
for instance P given in Example 1 and let t = 10. Then we know that x1 ∈
{0.5, 0.65} because the 9 remaining xk values must also be distinct elements of
P. Consequently, for each xk there are generally only a few possible values it
can take and thus in our analysis we choose to treat each Lj value as a constant.













Consider now the mutual information I(S;S[p]) between S and S[p];
I(S;S[p]) = h(S[p])− h(S[p]|S)
= h(SL0(p) +B(p))− h(SL0(p) +B(p)|S)
= h(SL0(p) +B(p))− h(B(p)),
(23)
where we use that I(X,Y ) is symmetric, that L0 is a constant, and that S and
B(p) are independent. Before we proceed, we remark that when fs(x) given in
step 3. of Algorithm 1, is evaluated in one of the xk values chosen in step 1.,
yk is outputted. That is, fs(xk) = yk, see (18). Recall that each yk is Gaussian
distributed and since xk ∈ P, we have that exactly t shares are completely
independent of the secret s. Thus, in this best case scenario, which is true for
t shares, I(S;S[p]) = 0 and there is no leak of information. To analyse the
information leakage of the remaining n − t shares, we take the same approach
as in [28] and consider again (23). As discussed, B(p) are Gaussian distributed
and according to [27, p. 244], the differential entropy of a Gaussian distributed







where e is the Euler number. On the other hand, we do not make an assumption
of the distribution of SL0(p) +B(p), since this can vary from application to
application. Instead, we note that a high entropy of SL0(p) + B(p), results
in a higher I(S;S[p]) in equation (23). Thus, by using the maximum entropy
distribution (which is the Gaussian distribution) as the distribution of SL0(p)+
B(p), we establish an upper bound on the mutual information.


























In conclusion, choosing for instance σ2B(p) 100 times larger than the variance
of σ2SL0(p), the leaked information is at most 0.0072 bits (no matter the real
distribution of SL0(p) + B(p)), which is to be read in the way that on the
average one share of s leaks 0.0072 bits. For comparison, if the secret indeed is
Gaussian distributed with variance 10, the uncertainty about it is 3.7080 bits
and after learning s[p], the uncertainty is 3.7008 bits. Hence, each share s[p]
leaks only very little information about s, when choosing the variance σ2Y large
enough.
To continue this analysis, note that in the problem statement, we require
that a set of at most t shares should reveal very little information about the
secret. Thus, we now address the mutual information between s and a set of t
shares. That is,
I(S;S[1], . . . , S[t]) = h(S[1], . . . , S[t])− h(B(1), . . . , B(t)) (27)
Again, we notice that in the best case scenario, the set of t shares is exactly
the set of normally distributed values yj chosen in step 2. of Algorithm 1, i.e.
{s[p]}p∈T ′ = {yj}j∈T , where T = 1, . . . , t. In this case, all t shares are inde-
pendent of the secret s and thus we have no leak of information. This case
happens with a high probability if t is close to n. However, due to proper-
ties of the scheme, which we will explore in the following section, t might be
chosen less than bn2 c. In this case, we may have that none of the t shares
are independent of the secret. This would be the worst case scenario, which
we address now by establishing an upper bound for I(S;S[1], . . . , S[t]) by us-
ing the same trick as previously. Namely, we choose the t-variate Gaussian
distribution for XS = (S[1], . . . , S[t]), which is the maximum entropy distribu-
tion. Since the sum of two Gaussian distributions is still Gaussian, we have
that XB = (B(1), . . . , B(t)) also follows a t-variate Gaussian distribution. The


































Using (21), we can write the (i, j)’th term of the covariance matrix CXS , as
cXS (i, j) = cov (SL0(i) +B(i);SL0(j) +B(j))
= cov (SL0(i);SL0(j) +B(j)) + cov (B(i);SL0(j) +B(j))
= cov (SL0(i);SL0(j)) + cov (SL0(i);B(j))
+ cov (B(i);SL0(j)) + cov (B(i);B(j))
= cov (SL0(i);SL0(j)) + cov (B(i);B(j)) ,
(30)
where we use that SL0(i) and B(i) are independent. Therefore, we have
CXS = CXSL0 + CXB , (31)
where XSL0 = (SL0(1), . . . , SL0(t)).
Thus, analogue to the previous result, the leaked information is controlled
by the relation between the variance of S and the variance of Y . By choosing
σ2Y large compared to the variance of S, the determinant of CXS will be only
slightly larger than the determinant of CXB and we have that asymptotically,
the leaked information goes to zero bits.
We can therefore make the following proposition, stating that the scheme
fulfills the privacy requirement.
Proposition 1. The real number secret sharing scheme comprised of the algo-
rithms share and recon stated in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, respectively,
satisfy that for any δ > 0 there exists the covariance matrix CXB such that
I(S; {S[p]}i∈T ′) ≤ δ, (32)
for a secret s being the outcome a random variable S and shares {s[p]}p∈T ′ being
the outcome of the random variables {S[p]}p∈T ′ .
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Proof. We use (29) and (31). For short, we write A = CXSL0 , and B = CXB .
Since A and B are symmetric, in fact positive semi-definite, they can be si-
multaneously diagonalizable. We denote the eigenvalues of A by λiA, and B by
λiB . Let λA, λB be the maximal eigenvalue of A,B respectively, and λB be the






















Hence, by rescaling det(CXB ) by sufficiently large coefficient, the mutual
information I(S;S(1), . . . , S(t)) can be made arbitrarily small.
In the next section, we will show that the real number secret sharing scheme
also satisfies that final requirement.
4.2. Computations on Shares
In this section, we will define the algorithms add, mult, and inv, which
perform addition, multiplication and inverse of secrets directly on the shares
and, thus, does not leak any secrets. To improve readability and intuition, we
present the operations using scalars, however the methods are easily extendable
to matrices as well. To this end, we start by defining what we mean by shares
of a matrix (and equivalent; a vector).
Definition 2 (Secret shared matrix). Let A ∈ Rm1×m2 be a matrix and let each
entry of A be secret shared using share. To this end, A[p] denotes the matrix
consisting of the p’th share of each element in A, respectively.
For the rest of this section, assume that s, a ∈ R are secrets and that each
participant p ∈ P holds the shares s[p] and a[p], respectively.
4.2.1. Addition
We start out with the simplest operation, which is addition. The output
of the addition algorithm is that each participant p holds a share c[p], where
c = s + a. Note that since each share is a point on a polynomial, it can be
written as
s[p] = s+ α1p+ α2p
2 + · · ·+ αtpt, (33)
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and
a[p] = a+ β1p+ β2p
2 + · · ·+ βtpt, (34)
where αj , βj ∈ R are coefficients. Adding the above expressions yields
c[p] = s[p] + a[p] = (s+ a) + (α1 + β1)p+ · · ·+ (αt + βt)pt. (35)
Hence, by participant p performing s[p] + a[p], it now holds a share c[p],
where c = s+ a. To denote the computation of adding shares we simply use the
’+’ sign or we write add(s[p], a[p]) = c[p]. Note that subtraction is performed
on the shares equivalently, which we simply denote by ’−’.
4.2.2. Multiplication
Multiplying shares is somewhat more complicated. If we attempted to sim-
ply multiply the polynomials like we added them previously, we would find
that the degree of the resulting polynomial is 2t. In this case we need 2t+ 1
shares to reconstruct the secret. To avoid the growing degree of the polynomial,
we use a well-know trick called Beavers’ trick, [29]. It uses so-called triplets,
{r1[p], r2[p], r1r2[p]}p∈P of shares of (unknown) random numbers r1 and r2, and
their product r1r2. To create the triplets, it is typically required that t < bn2 c,
however there are ongoing research in efficient methods of generating Beaver
triplets for larger values of t, [30].
We state formally mult in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 3 mult(s[p], a[p]) = sa[p]
Input: {s[p]}p∈P ,{a[p]}p∈P shares of the secrets and {r1[p], r2[p], r1r2[p]}p∈P
shares of the unknown Beavers triplet.
Output: {sa[p]}p∈P , shares of the product of the secrets.
1:
d = recon({s[p]− r1[p]}p∈T ) (36)
e = recon({a[p]− r2[p]}p∈T ), (37)
2:
sa[p] = de+ dr2[p] + r1[p]e+ r1r2[p], (38)
To see that the multiplication protocol in Algorithm 3 is correct, perform
the following rewrite
s = d+ r1
a = e+ r2,
(39)
to see that
sa[p] = (d+ r1[p])(e+ r2[p]). (40)
Note that a public constant (like e and d in this case) can be directly multiplied
on the shares by each participant. This can easily be verified by using the same
approach as showing that the add protocol is correct.
We also remark that d = s+ r1 and e = a+ r2 are revealed in plain text in
Algorithm 3. Since r1 and r2 are Gaussian distributed, d and e does not leak
more than a share of the secrets. However, we give here the upper bound of the
information leak of knowing both t shares of s and also d.
I(S; {S[p]}p∈T ′ , S +R1)
= h({S[p]}p∈T ′ , S +R1)− h({S[p]}p∈T ′ , S +R1|S)
= h({S[p]}p∈T ′ , S +R1)
− h({SL0(p) +B(p)}p∈T ′ , S +R1|S)
= h({S[p]}p∈T ′ , S +R1)− h({B(p)}p∈T ′ , R1)
(41)
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s1[p] s2[p] d e
Figure 4: Example of the information known about two secrets s1 and s2 after executing the
mult algorithm. In the worst case, the adversary knows t = 3 shares of each of the secrets
and the values d and e revealed by mult. In this example s1 = 34.5 and s2 = 3.42, which is
very hard to deduce from the revealed information.
To find an upper bound on the information leakage we use the maximal entropy
distribution for the distribution of XSR1 = ({S[p]}p∈T ′ , S +R1). By design,
XBR1 = ({B(p)}p∈P , R1) are distributed according to a multivariate Gaussian











where CXSR1 , CXBR1 are the covariance matrices of XSR1 and XBR1 , respec-
tively. As seen, the result in (42) is very similar to the one obtained in (29). To
demonstrate the (at most) revealed data using mult, Example 2 demonstrates
the multiplication of two secrets. Note that in section 5 we numerically estimate
the leak of information caused by the multiplication protocol.
Example 2 (Multiplication of shares). Let the number of participants n = 7,
P = {1, 2, . . . , 7}, and the threshold t = 3. Consider two secret s1 = 34.5
and s2 = 3.42 and the multiplication of them performed on their shares. To
demonstrate the (small) information leak caused by mult, Fig. 4 depicts t = 3
shares of each secret and the values d and e revealed by the algorithm. As
seen, it is very hard to deduce the true values of the secrets using the revealed
information.
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We use mult(s[p], a[p]) = sa[p]) to denote the computation of multiplying
shares using Beaver’s trick. In continuation, we note that mult can easily take
two matrices as input, for instance A[p] with A ∈ Rm1×m2 and B[p] with
B ∈ Rm2×m3 . In this case the Beavers triplet is also matrices; R1 ∈ Rm1×m2 ,
R2 ∈ Rm2×m3 and R1R2 is the matrix-matrix product. The rest of algorithm
3 remains unchanged.
4.2.3. Division
We consider the inversion s−1 and note that one could afterwards use mult
to compute a secret divided by another secret. We propose to compute this





where r ∈ R is a random number. To this end, we propose to use a normally
distributed random variable r which is unknown to the participants. This r
can be constructed in the following way; each participant p chooses a Gaussian
distributed value rp and distributes the shares rp[j] to participant j ∈ P. Each
participant p then computes its share of r by r[p] =
∑
j∈P rj [p].
To calculate (43), the participants use recon(mult(s[p], r[p])) = sr to learn
in plain text the product sr. Subsequently, they each compute s−1[p] = 1sr r[p]
to learn individual shares of s−1. To improve readability, we state the division
algorithm in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 inv(s[p]) = s−1[p]
Input: {s[p]}p∈P shares of the secret and {r[p]}p∈P shares of an unknown
random value r ∈ R.
Output: {s−1[p]}p∈P , shares of the inverse secret.
1: sr = recon(mult(s[p], r[p]).
2: s−1[p] = (sr)−1r[p].
We remark that the plain text sr does reveal some information about s.
However, this information leak can be upper bounded. We here compute the
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maximal information leak about s from a set of t shares of s joint with sr.
I(S; {S[p]}p∈T ′ , SR) = h({S[p]}p∈T ′ , SR)− h({S[p]}p∈T ′ , SR|S)
= h({S[p]}p∈T ′ , SR)− h({SL0(p) +B(p)}p∈T ′ , SR|S)
= h({S[p]}p∈T ′ , SR)− h({B(p)}p∈T ′ , R)
(44)
We do not make assumptions on the joint distribution ofXSR = ({S[p]}p∈P , SR),
thus we make an upper bound for the mutual information by choosing the max-
imal entropy distribution. By design, XBR = ({B(p)}p∈P , R) are distributed











which is a very similar result to the one obtained in (29).
We denote the computation of s−1[p] as inv(s[p]) = s−1[p] and note that
also inv can take a matrix as input. In this case the random value r is simply a
random matrix of suitable dimension and the rest of the algorithm remains the
same.
5. Numerical Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the numerical performance of the proposed real
number secret sharing scheme. To this end, we have implemented the scheme
on a laptop PC in the programming language Python that uses the IEEE 754
floating point standard. We start by evaluating the accuracy of the scheme
in terms of the variance of the Gaussian distributed yj values in Algorithm 1.
The parameters we have chosen are n = 11 participants, t = 5, and the secrets
s1 = 5.5 and s2 = 34.7. We simulate both recon (Algorithm 2), add, mult
(Algorithm 3), and inv (Algorithm 4), where we start by generating shares of
the secrets using Algorithm 1. Afterwards, we either directly reconstruct the
secret using recon in Algorithm 2 or use respectively, add, mult, or div on the
shares before reconstruction. To evaluate the accuracy, we use the root square
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recon add mult inv
Figure 5: Accuracy of the algorithms recon, add, mult, and inv in terms of the variance of
the Gaussian distributed yj values in share (Algorithm 1). The loss of accuracy is due to
numerical errors.





Fig. 5 depicts the RSE between v and v̂ as a function of σ2Y , for all four
algorithms. As seen, as σ2Y is increased, the accuracy slowly decreases. This
is purely due to numerical errors, because as the yj values in Algorithm 1 in-
creases, the shares grow exponentially large and consequently loose precision
due to the floating point representation. The reason why inv achieves such
high precision, is because the outputted shares are relatively small due to the
reciprocal operation of the algorithm.
Finally, we numerically evaluate the privacy properties of the scheme. That
is, we estimate the privacy loss of the secret from one share, from t shares and
from performing multiplication. In particular, we estimate I(S;S[1]) in (25),
I(S;S[1], . . . , S[t]) in (27) , and I(S;S[1], . . . , S[t], S + R1) in (41), based on
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I(S;S[1], . . . , S[t])
I(S;S[1], . . . , S[t], S + R1)
Figure 6: Mutual information (MI) between a standard normal distributed secret, S and,
respectively, one share of S, t shares of S, and t shares of S joint with S + R1 for a normal
distributed variable R1 (see Algorithm 3).
simulated data. These estimations are a product of statistical analysis, thus
we generate a large sample size of each relevant variable for each estimation.
We simulate in each case the secret S ∼ N (0, 1) and the remaining variables
are computed based on the secret. Fig. 6 depicts all three estimations and
as expected, one share of the secret leaks very little information while t shares
clearly has a greater leak. As seen, these numerical results validate the theoret-
ical results.
6. Application to Kalman filtering
To demonstrate our proposed privacy preserving computation framework,
we use the Kalman filter [31] to estimate x̂k of (1) when given only real number
secret shared versions of the observations in (2). The Kalman filter consists of
the following 5 equations, where P is the covariance matrix of the estimate, K
is the Kalman gain and Q and R are covariance matrices of the process and
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measurement noise respectively,
x̃k = Ax̂k−1 + Buk
P̃ k = AP k−1A
> + Qk




x̂k = x̃k + Kk(zk −Hx̃k)
P k = P̃ k −KkHkP̃ k.
(46)
We consider the following scenario. Assume that n none-colluding entities
are used as computing units, hereafter referred to as computing parties. That is,
the computing parties perform all computations given only shares of the data.
Each time the computing parties receive shares of a new measurement, they
compute a new update of the state estimate. We do not specify who delivers
these measurements, but it could likely be from a collection of nodes or from a
set of other participants. The computing parties are not allowed to learn any
clear text data and they only output shares (which can afterwards be reconstruct
to the clear text output).
In Algorithm 5, we state a privacy preserving Kalman filter based on the




Input: uk[p] for all k, are shares of the observations, P 0 and K0 can be
initialized as identity matrices.
Output: x̂k[p]; the estimate of the k’th state of the system.
1: for all k do
2: x̃k[p] = mult(A[p], x̂k−1[p]) + mult(B[p],uk[p])
3: V k[p] = mult(P k−1[p],A
>[p])
4: P̃ k[p] = mult(A[p],V k[p]) + Qk[p]
5: Sk[p] = mult(H[p], mult(P̃ k[p],H
>[p])) + Rk[p]
6: Kk[p] = mult(mult(P̃ k[p],H
>[p]), inv(Sk[p]))
7: yk[p] = zk[p]− mult(Hk[p], x̃k[p])
8: x̂k[p] = x̃k[p] + mult(Kk[p],yk[p])
9: P k[p] = P̃ k[p]− mult(Kk[p], mult(Hk[p], P̃ k[p]))
10: end for
Remark that Algorithm 5 does not reveal the result or any intermediate
results.
6.1. Simulation
We have simulated Algorithm 5 and compared its estimation performance
to the algorithm in (46) which does not provide any privacy. Thus, we want
to evaluate the sacrifice in output utility when using the privacy preserving
algorithm. We thus simulate both algorithms solving the same problem and
compare the results. We conduct the simulation on a laptop PC based on a
Python implementation of the algorithms. We use n = 3 computing parties and
t = 1. For the sharing algorithm we use mean value zero and variance 1000 for
the Gaussian distributed shares.
We use the RSE between the result from Algorithm 5, x̂
(priv)
k , and (46), x̂k,





k − x̂k)2, for k = 1, 2, . . . .
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Figure 7: RSE between simulated result from Algorithm 5 and (46).
In Fig. 7 it is seen that the difference in result from the privacy preserving
solution and the non-private solution lies around the third decimal. In compar-
ison, the difference for the solution in [12] lies before the decimal point.
Regarding the complexities, as seen, Algorithm 5 uses 12 multiplications
and one inversion, which amounts to 27 interactive operations, independent of
the dimension of the matrices. [12] does not provide the complexity for their
solution, thus, we provide here an underestimation of the number of interactive
operations which lies around 10M + l + 1, where M is the dimension of the
matrix R in (46) and l is the number of bits used to represent the numbers
(which in the simulations by [12] is at least 24 bits).
7. Conclusion
The paper presents a real number secret sharing scheme that bypasses the
requirements on integer shares and modular arithmetic which is used in state-of-
the-art secure multiparty computation schemes. That the scheme does not use
modular arithmetic, makes it very useful for computations directly on shares
including division. The trade-off is that the proposed scheme is not perfectly
secure, however, we show that the information leak can be upper bounded and
demonstrate with examples how small the leak is. We see the proposed scheme
with its high level accuracy and privacy properties and its low communication
complexity as offering a relevant trade-off between between privacy of the dis-
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tributed computations and practicality of the scheme. Numerical evaluations of
the proposed scheme as well as simulations of the scheme to perform Kalman
filtering with privacy preservation verify the theoretic results.
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